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ABSTRACT
This review synthesises the literature studying interactions among stakeholders in Indonesian forest
governance. Having described major trends in former studies, the study discusses evidences and best
practices in the management of Indonesian forests. It then discusses the framework proposal for depicting
interactions among government, local people, and private companies. Key aspects to consider in the
discussion are how to design effective mechanisms and incentives that may minimize frictions among the
stakeholders. Such mechanisms may lead to forest sustainability. The review concludes by discussing avenues
for future research.
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Introduction
The world’s tropical forests governance remains
weak (Sundström, 2016), including in Indonesia
(Alesina et al., 2019). Deforestation in the tropics re-
ceives key attention in the perspective of worldwide
climate change and biodiversity damages. Here,
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) emanates the farmings, forests, and other
terrestrialusages currently contribute to a quarter of
global greenhouse releases (Leblois et al., 2017).
Economists had studied the causes of deforestation
for years and across multiplelevels (Angelsen and
Kaimowitz, 1999; Leblois et al., 2017). Recently,
Leblois, Damette and Wolfersberger (2017) reveal
that trade is the most important driver of deforesta-
tion, despite any other factors. In Indonesia, Burgess
et al. (2012) find corruption is directing to deforesta-
tion and most currently Alesina, Gennaioli and
Lovo (2019) find such deforestation positively
linked to the level of tribal division.
A growing field of scholarly research has inves-
tigated forest governance with an output to mini-
mize deforestation (Burgess et al., 2012; Leblois et al.,
2017; Wehkamp et al., 2018; Alesina et al., 2019;
Chaikumbung et al., 2019), nevertheless most of
them treat the governance factors separately. Hence,
our understanding of integrated forest governance
is in need of further progress.
Wehkamp et al. (2018) suggest future research to
evaluate how far governance in sectors outside the
forest sector, may affect deforestation rates. Further-
more, they also suggest to analyse the impacts of
forest governance within conservation setting as
well as the fundamental procedures. In addition, a
thorough analysis is also warranted on the defores-
tation patterns. Chaikumbung et al., (2019) suggest
future research to uncover the underlying channels
of institutions improvements to shed lights the di-
lemma between development and preservation.
Galinato and Galinato (2013) suggest future studies
to evaluate the contribution of other determinants
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on deforestation, e.g. rural poverty. Leblois et al.
(2017) find that most importantly, trade is playing
an important role in leveraging deforestation. How-
ever, the impactrelies on the country’s uniqueness
and thus better-adjusted incentives per country are
suggested. They suggest future research to elucidate
variations in the rate of deforestation. Secco et al.
(2014) suggest future research to explore the possi-
bilities of rising up the local forest-governance
metrics. Here, improved metrics are required for
specific multifaceted elements and micro-elements
of forest management.
The scholars’ suggestions lead to the two aims of
this review: First, to summarize the best practices
and empirical findings from relevant literatures per-
taining to forest management practices in Indonesia,
in a thematic manner. Second, to model interactions
among stakeholders of Indonesian forest gover-
nance. This study recognise that vital elements in
designing interactions within forest management is
the deliverance of optimal institutions mechanisms
to reduce deforestation. Further research sugges-
tions are then presented.
Studies on Indonesian Forests’ Governance
Forest remains an important international issue.
IPCC projected 1.6 billion tons of carbon has been
released each year as a result of land use in relation
with tropical forest deforestation (Denman et al.,
2007). The governance of existing forests was sug-
gested as the cheapest way to mitigate climate
change (Leblois et al., 2017).
Deforestation is a destruction process of forest’s
top-soil by permanent changes of the land use.
Tropical rainforest deforestation may increase
greenhouse emission in the earth atmosphere, de-
stroy forest habitat, and devastate society’s life re-
sources (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1999). In
2005, Forest Resource Assessment (FRA) reported
that deforestation progressed in a worrying level.
International mitigations had been conducted, such
as the initiative of United Nation Framework for
Climate Change Convention (UNFCC) along De-
cember 2005 to 2007 to assess and reconsider the
deforestation policy, especially in developing coun-
tries. Here, the focus was on knowledge sharing,
methods and techniques of deforestation, including
policy approaches and positive incentives (Leblois
et al., 2017).
The deforestation issue remains a stable dis-
course as it benefits many stakeholders. Stemmed
from the value-added of wood productions, many
tropical lands had been transformed in a low eco-
nomical level with an intention to attract
investors.In addition, deforestations still exist albeit
the Kyoto Protocol has arranged agreements and
international regulations on deforestation and refor-
estation.
Indonesia possesses one of the widest regions of
tropical forest worldwide. Ranked third after Brazil
and Zaire, Indonesian forest area reaches 135 mil-
lion hectares, covering 10 percent of the total world
tropical forest (Department of Forestry of Indonesia,
2009). Such wide areas trigger parties and stake-
holders to deliver deforestations for their own inter-
ests. Based on the data of Directorate of Forest and
Land Rehabilitation, the Indonesian forest defores-
tation and degradation is increasing each year. The
amount of 0.9 million hectares per year on 1982-
1990 has increased into 1.8 million hectares per year
on 1991-1997 and again it is increasing into 2.83 mil-
lion hectares per year. Even though in 2006 there
Table 1. Critical land areas across Indonesia in 2006 (in hectare)
ID Land Function Critical Land Categories
Semi-Critical Critical Highly-Critical Total
I Outside Area 16.082.933 8.587.558 2.102.753 26.773.245
II Inside Area 31527.148 14.718.675 4.787.813 51.033.636
1 Conservation Forest 3.002.261 1.021.015 332.077 4.355.352
2 Protected Forest 6.051.764 2.527.270 724.664 9.303.699
3 Production Forest 8.919.109 4.284.581 2.052.204 15.255.895
4 Converted Forest 5.367.368 4.212.741 969.213 10.549.323
5 Limited Production Forest 8.186.644 2.673.067 709.655 11.569.367
Total 47.610.081 23.306.233 6.890.567 77.806.881
Source: Department of Forestry of Indonesia (2009)
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was a decrease about 1 million hectares per year, the
pace of rehabilitation and reforestation only reaches
500.000-700.000 hectares per year.
The significant deforestation in Indonesia may
stem from the definition bias of deforestation. It
seems the definition has been inconclusive, since
many questions arise: (1) Does deforestation mean
the permanent loss of forest or it includes a tempo-
rary loss as well? (2) Does it mean the loss of forest
cover for all purposes or the loss of forest cover for
wood production? (3) Who are the deforestation
actors? Are they who open forest cover or they who
impede the re-growth of forest cover? (Sunderlin
and Resosudarmo, 1999). The FAO & World Bank’
research (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1999) implic-
itly states that the losses of forest cover, either per-
manently or temporarily, are categorized as defores-
tation. In addition, the research explicitly states the
area and the process of moving fields which may
become a secondary forest are parts of deforesta-
tion. As such, the deforestation in Indonesia is con-
stantly increasing.
The deforestation in Indonesia also improves
critical land areas. Critical land refers to an unpro-
ductive land which could not be restored into farm-
ing land without significant efforts. This character-
ized with a very fast erosion process, causing fertile
soil is getting thinner and suffered economic and
environmental functions. Up to 2006, the critical
land inside and outside the forest area were about
77.806.880 hectares. The details are shown in Table
1.
In all, while deforestation could degrade environ-
mental quality, induce climate change, and produce
excessive carbon emissions, it is still used as a main
economical resource to stakeholders. The stakehold-
ers in this study are: (1) Government, (2) Local
people, and (3) Private companies.
Table 2 summarises the recent researches on the
likely interactions among government, local people,
and private companies in the forest management. It
shows that the interactions among stakeholders
definitely influence the management of forests and
resources.
In the domain of the interaction between local
people and deforestation, Fraser in William (1996)
argues the growth of inhabitant density causes the
deforestation problem in Indonesia, vice versa.
Here, the illegal loggings conducted by companies
are causing deforestation. The deforestation creates
empty lands which then are used by moving farm-
ers and as such, the deforestation increases popula-
tion density in an area.
Another arguments state local people are signifi-
cant determinant in reforestation efforts by redevel-
oping endangered lands and people-plant-forests
(Obidzinski and Dermawan, 2010; Khasanah et al.,
2016; De Royer et al., 2018). The replanting of endan-
gered lands or the dormant lands utilizes economi-
cally-benefit plants through agroforestry system/
mixed planting (Khasanah et al., 2016). Besides the
replant of endangered land, the interactions be-
tween local people and reforestation are emerged
with the development of Integrated Forest Manage-
ment. Part of such actions is the advancement of
People-Plant-Forest (Obidzinski and Dermawan,
2010). Nevertheless, such KPH program needs sup-
port and fund-commitment from central and re-
gional government.
Government acts as a regulator and facilitator
who bridge the interactions among local people and
companies so the deforestation activities conducted
by the both parties could run in an efficient way,
either from economical or environmental aspect.
One way is through Reduction of Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), a
program to reduce the level of forest deforestation
and degradation with a goal to decrease emissions
from such deforestation. However, the program left
several trade-offs as follow: (1) The diminishing of
incentives from industrial countries to reduce car-
bon productions; (2) The transfer of deforestation to
regions uncovered by REDD; (3) The increasing dis-
parities in regions where population lives in forests
with unclear land status of possession; (4) The loss
of cultural and biological diversity which indirectly
in line with the measurement scheme of REDD; (5)
The degradation of the meaning of community-
based forest protection.
Therefore, government efforts to overcome defor-
estation through REDD still have some pitfalls. Par-
ticipations are warranted from stakeholders in
order to create balanced policies. The balance may
lift a comprehensive planning and execution and
then building trust toward REDD through partici-
pative dialogues (Hirsch et al., 2011).
Discussion
This study conducts literature review and proposes
a conceptual framework of forest governance in In-
donesia, following a multi-agents framework (see
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Table 2. Summary of previous researches on forest management
Study Study Aim Findings Relevance with the Current Study
De Royer, Van Analysing the progress The CBFM schemes The study indicates that  rights
Noordwijk and of community-based lack in achieving goals redistribution only contributes to
Roshetko (2018) forest management and technical supports. social justice when it acknowledges
(CBFM) schemes in Instead of empowering local aspirations and cultural values.
Indonesia across three communities, the Hence, more active interactions from
provinces and three programme acted more local people with government and








Leblois, Updating the recent (1) Common drivers of Trade plays a significant role
Damette and determinants of deforestation tend to in the deforestation pace. This may
Wolfersberger deforestation in tropical elucidate the indicate an interplay between
(2017) countries, using a new deforestation in private companies and government
time-series-based data the 2000s, in the forest governance. Moreover,
of satellite images (2) Trade in forestry and an increasing population may
agricultural intensify local people’ interactions
commodities plays with local government in the forest





(4) The effect of trade is
significant in forest-
endowed countries
Workman, T. Describing the process Recognition of the rights The study findings supports
et al. (2015) of policy developments of customary communities further studies on the
on customary forest in depend on the ‘fair’ interactions between local
Bulukumba, Indonesia. regulation produced people, government (especially
The study asserts the collaboratively by all on developing regulations),
importance of stakeholders, as well as and private companies
stakeholders the commitment of to in acknowledging the rights
commitment in  implement the of local communities.
recognising the rights   regulation.
of customary
communities
Obidzinski and Evaluating a community The HTR policy was poor The study recommends five
Dermawan (2010) timber plantation in design and weak in policy adjustments in the areas
programme in Indonesia implementation. The of financial stability, legal, and
called HTR (Hutan policy does deliver risks transparency in land allocation
Tanaman Rakyat or of encouraging illegal and financing. Such suggestions
community timber deforestation. mainly may relate to the
plantation) since 2006. Nevertheless, the policy interactions between local
remains have the people and government.
potential to rehabilitate
land, support the






Alesina, Investigating the The level of deforestation A properly aligned interactions
Gennaioli and contribution of the in Indonesia positively between local people and
Lovo (2019) characteristics of local relates to the degree of government may be
populations on illegal ethnic diversity. In warranted since a more
logging in Indonesia, addition, there is a homogeneous ethnic group
an extremely ethnically trade-off between reduced increases competition in




Figure 1). Central government act as a principal and
the local stakeholders are the agent. The local stake-
holders consist of municipal governments, forestry
companies, and local forest communities. Municipal
governments manage forests based on the regula-
tions jointly developed with central government.
The forestry companies and local forest communi-
ties within the jurisdiction of municipal govern-
ments must comply with the regulations on forest
governance which are developed by the municipal
governments.
asymmetric information. In this study, the main fo-
cus would be on finding alternatives of effective and
efficient monitoring schemes regardingthe obedi-
ence of agents, in an economic context.
The social circumstance in the forestry problems
is marked with an imbalanced power among local
stakeholders. Such power relationship related to a
question on bargaining distribution among stake-
holders: Do stakeholders possess a balanced power,
or the power is concentrated in one or more stake-
holders?
Theoretically, municipal governments have a
higher hierarchical level than companies and local
people. Nonetheless, there are three different sce-
narios in accordance to the power relationship be-
tween local officers and forestry companies. In the
first scenario, the local officers have their authorities
to manage forest activities in a local jurisdiction and
to monitor the companies’ obedience. Here, local
governments act as the parties who decide the level
of bribery and illegal deforestation. Provided the
local governments do not want to be bribed, the
companies must be able to avoid or hide such illegal
deforestation. In the second scenario, the forestry
companies may have a sufficient power to bargain,
equally, with the municipal governments. There-
fore, the bribe level and illegal deforestation would
become a join decision between both parties. In the
last scenario, the companies may possess a huge fi-
nancial power and political connection, and as such
they may determine the level of illegal deforestation
and bribery. Here, the local officers positioned to
facilitate the companies decisions.
Regarding the role of local inhabitants, they may
Fig. 1. The principal multi-agents framework for decen-
tralized forest governance
The essential problem within the principal multi-
agents framework is finding the institutional
mechanisms that synchronize the interplaying inter-
ests of the agents with the goals of central govern-
ment as the principal. In this sense, the goals of the
principal could be attained even under a setting of
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(or may not) have the bargaining power to influence
decision making related to the forest use activities.
Therefore, provided they do not possess power, the
local people could only accept the consequences of
decision making or the local people could organize
and develop bargaining position to fight against the
decisions created by the other stakeholders.
The varied scenarios on the power relationships
among the stakeholders may influence the interac-
tion patterns as well as the wealthy level among the
stakeholders. Based on the above literature review
and arguments, this study proposes the interaction
patterns among stakeholders in Figure 2 as follows:
Figure 2 depicts interaction patterns in the usage
of forest land. There are three main actors: (1) Gov-
ernment (central and local), (2) Private companies,
and (3) Local people. They have their own interests
which create an interaction patterns. At least, the
interaction patterns are: (1) Government-local
people, (2) Government-companies, and (3) Compa-
nies-local people. In addition, there are regulations
(by government) intervene the relationship of local
people and companies. Furthermore, non-govern-
ment-organisation (NGO) has a non-regulation role
such as monitoring the interaction of government
and companies, government and local people, and
the activities of forest resources use by companies
and local people.
The interactions of local people and government
Local people or inhabitantswho livealong the forest
region usually use forest as one of their livelihood
through either consumption or production activities
or housing. However, such activities often impact
on the degradation of forest lands. For example, the
forest and land use around TahuraNipa-Nipa (Indo-
nesia) by the local people, especially in the south
part, indicate a shift along 1990-2010 period. Here,
the decreasing of forest area approximately around
2-12% per year (Widayati et al., 2014).
The trade-off between the needs (or interests) of
forest conservation and the usage of forest resources
(as a livelihood for local people), pushes and ema-
nates a need of regulation frameworks which may
accommodate both interests. Community-based for-
est management (CBFM) is one of the regulation
frameworks that arrange forest management. This
program embraces the active participation of local
people which cover local people livelihood and for-
est conservation. The CBFM indicates that society
must be involved in the land protection efforts to-
ward the sustainability of natural resources and
environment. In addition, such strategy does have
to consider the rights of land usage for the
sustainability of local people. Here, the local people
should be given access to the use of forest resources,
with an agreement on tree species which will be
planted in certain areas (Widayati et al., 2014).
Wiersum (1997) arguesthat within CBFM, the re-
quired lists of local communities on the manage-
ment of forest exploitation include: (1) Structures for
community member in accordance to the required
human-resource management, (2) An adequate re-
straint of member behaviour which ensure the plan-
ning strategy and the management practices could
be well-conducted, (3) the control of forest products
Fig. 2. The interaction patterns in the usage of forest resources
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distribution, and (4) the capability to ‘discard’ out-
siders. In addition, the stimulus to improve local
people participation in the conservation activities
and forest management should not be based on the
general policy of forest. Instead, the perspectives
and the priorities of local people community should
be in line with the professional foresters (govern-
ment-owned organisations).
Nevertheless, the CBFM encounters application
problems, especially in Indonesia. Although the
program has a strong regulation framework within
all levels, the government attention remains on the
administrative matters (regulation) and as such the
field verification did not run properly (in accor-
dance to forest area exploitation). In addition, there
is ignorance of forest management problems albeit
the CBFM initial design was to solve the problems
of land exploitation and conflict resolution (De
Royer et al., 2018). Further, De Royer et al., (2018)
and Khasanah et al. (2016) add that new conflicts are
emerged and the parties are returning to old habit
(business as usual) or nothing changes. The lack of
coordination and communication among
government’s departments and local people, as well
as miscommunication on regulation interpretation,
often yield conflicts.
Another factor is the minimal facilitation and
technical guidance to main-target group within
CBFM under relevant institution/unit (stemmed
from the lack of fund). This creates a panic imple-
mentation process where the target group within
society (usually the poor villagers and they who do
not possess land) could not be embraced properly.
The implementation and feedback of CBFM in soci-
ety level are worsened by the poor coordination
among institutions, role overlap, and lack of fund
(De Royer et al., 2018).
De Royer et al. (2018) find CBFM can only handle
the problems of forest land possession, the legaliza-
tion of forest community, and forest rehabilitation.
However it cannot solve the problems of local
people empowerment. The fact is, local people still
have constraints on the opportunity to use forest
land. In addition, the participation of local people
remains insignificant and there is almost no coach-
ing on financial and technical skills. Consequently,
the implementation of CBFM could not deliver so-
cial justice to local people except by the
acknowledgement and the improvement of local
people’ participation.
The interactions of private companies and
government
The interactions of private companies and govern-
ment in the forest exploitations had been occurred
at Spain, Argentina, and Chile (Cubbage et al., 2010;
Vadell et al., 2016). In the middle of 18th century,
Spain encounters a serious deforestation problem.
Approximately Spain only had 12.5 percent out of
its national forest territory. The massive deforesta-
tion stemmed from industrial activities which based
on forest resources, a reality that occurs recently in
developing countries (Vadell et al., 2016). This
shows the role of companies in contributing to mas-
sive deforestation. Nonetheless, it indicates a di-
lemma since the massive deforestation is followed
by the escalation of forest-based-goods needs. In
dealing with such dilemma, a regulation framework
is warranted to simultaneously accommodate forest
conservation and companies’ production demand.
In dealing with such dilemma, Argentina and
Chile implemented certification policy on forest ex-
ploitation under consideration of environmental
sustainability. The forest certification program is
applied to optimise forest governance, forest protec-
tion, and social assistances through a possession of
forest land and forest exploitation practices.
Cubbage et al. (2010) assert such certification pro-
gram in Argentina and Chile has successfully
pushed companies to create policy changes in forest
management and forest protection. Such changes
include: (1) the limitation of chemical utilization, (2)
the development of protection planning of endan-
gered species, (3) the intensification of operational
management practices, (4) the prevention of hostile-
wild-plants’ invasion, (5) biological diversification,
(6) high conservation forest value, (7) the transpar-
ent preparation of forest-management plan, and (8)
the arrangement of plantation-guidance meeting.
Nevertheless, such changes spend relatively-enor-
mous costs in complying standards of forest certifi-
cation.
The triangle nexus: Interactions of private com-
panies, local people, and government in the usage of
forest resources
One of the drivers of the interaction patterns
among companies, local people, and government is
externalities emerged from the exploitation activi-
ties of forest land. For instance, forest land exploita-
tion for production activities by companies may
cause multi-dimensional impacts (social, cultural,
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economics, environment, health, and so on) toward
local people. The externalities attract government
involvement in curbing such problem. Along the
last 30 years, Kajangtribal community who resides
at Bulukumba-South Sulawesi (Indonesia) has lost
most of their region. Here, a rubber company titled
PT Lonsum owns 5,000 hectares of Land-Exploita-
tion-Right areas, spreading around Kajang area at
Bulukumba. The community currently only owns
below 500 hectares of forest along their tribal region
(Workman et al., 2015). A number of regulations
obviously state the acknowledgement of tribal com-
munity and tribal area is an order from municipal
government. However, municipal governments
usually tend to govern and not acknowledge such
tribal rights. Furthermore, the participation of tribal
community remains insignificant.
Workman et al. (2015) suggest several actions to
overcome the problems. First, issuance of regional
regulations or at least Regent’s decision letters
which clearly acknowledge the existence of tribal
communities and set their land. Second, collabora-
tive attempts which could interpret the demand of
stakeholders into proper regulations, based on rep-
resentativeness, political, and operational aspects.
Third, optimization of the facilitators’ role as a de-
veloper and a trainer in building knowledge and
technical skills of the regional parties to prepare
their own regional regulations, and in assisting local
people in leveraging their local knowledge. The cer-
tification programs on land use which has been
implemented by Argentina and Chile governments
may be a positive example, as it deliver changes in
social aspect by conducting a routine public hearing
(especially with the local people). The goal is to cre-
ate harmony in land use activities (Cubbage et al.,
2010).
In addition, the interaction does created by the
mechanism of policy setting, based on participatory
approach. The United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel of Forest Program (UNIPFP) has declared that
the national and sub-national forestry programs
must implement the participatory mechanisms. An
intense participation in policy setting could produce
sustainable solutions in the exploitation of forest
land. In Finland, the problems on participatory
mechanisms are stemmed from the different inter-
ests of stakeholders pertaining to forest manage-
ment. Moreover, approximately 60 percent of forest
land is possessed by family entities (more than
300,000 owners). This creates disharmony in the
participatory-based policy setting (Tikkanen et al.,
2016). Tikkanen et al. (2016) argue Decision Support
Methods (DSM) should be implemented to govern
priority scales as well as strategic directions on con-
crete actions. Here, the discussions on future alter-
natives and priorities within multi-stakeholder
groups, through simple-attributes-rating-technique,
are the most promising approach in driving the ef-
fectiveness of program preparation.
In between the interaction problems between pri-
vate companies and local people, government deliv-
ers its role through regulations such as on law en-
forcement, policies (using participatory mecha-
nisms), and land certification to intervene the inter-
action patterns of companies and local people.
Conclusion
This review tries to synchronise recent studies of in-
teraction among stakeholders in forest governance.
It reveals the findings of the roles of government,
private companies, and local inhabitants in Indone-
sian forest governance. The findings indicate there
are interactions on the activities of the stakeholders
in forest use. As such, this study would like to rec-
ommend future researchers to investigate the forms
of government interventions which probably effec-
tive in handling interactions between companies
and local people. This study suggests that one way
to further the investigation is to deliver experiment
and game theory concerning the interaction of the
three stakeholders.
This study also suggest that a wide evaluation on
the stakeholders’ interaction may deliver benefits.
As such, future research could implement a quanti-
tative survey concerning the model of stakeholders’
interplays in forest management. The survey could
validate the findings of experiment and game
theory of stakeholders’ interaction. Here, a survey
across Indonesia may be of benefit.
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